Who Controls the ‘World Ocean’ Commands the World – The American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator

In a previous article in The American Spectator, I asked: “Are we at the end of American maritime hegemony?” The article noted the concern expressed by two naval experts that our diminished shipbuilding capacity was endangering our maritime supremacy. I noted that in his much-overlooked book Britain and the British Seas, the great geopolitical thinker Sir Halford Mackinder wrote that “the unity of the ocean is the simple physical fact underlying the dominant value of sea-power in the modern globe-wide world.” (RELATED: Are We at the End of American Maritime Hegemony?)

His American counterpart, Alfred Thayer Mahan, in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, described the oceans as “a great highway” and a “wide common.” Now, the renowned strategist Edward Luttwak warns us on X that unless our shipbuilding capacity greatly increases, “the U.S. Navy will wither away.”

Luttwak is the author of seminal books on strategy, including The Political Uses of Sea Power (1974), where he argued that in addition to the importance of a navy in combat operations, sea power can be used in support of allies, “armed suasion,” and deterrence. “Any instrument of military power that can be used to inflict damage upon an adversary, physically limit his freedom of action, or reveal his intentions,” Luttwak explained, “may also affect his conduct, and that of any interested third parties, even if force is never actually used.”

Luttwak described the deterrent function of sea power as a “shadow that impinges on the freedom of action of adversaries, because the capabilities perceived can be activated at any time, while the formulation of the intent to use them can be both silent and immediate.”

Luttwak estimated that between 1945 and 1974, the U.S. Navy engaged in “armed suasion” on at least 70 occasions, ranging from the Caribbean Sea to North Korea. Interestingly, one such occasion was in June-July 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, when the Seventh Fleet was ordered to position itself between China and Taiwan. This move effectively deterred China from following through on its plans to invade Taiwan. Deterrence, of course, is aimed at the mind of your enemy.

Nearly 20 years after Luttwak’s book was published, Colin Gray wrote The Leverage of Sea Power, where he presented historical case studies to show that “great sea powers or maritime coalitions have either won or, occasionally, drawn every major war in modern history.”

Gray noted that the lessons of history taught that for maritime powers, “command at sea provides the strategic conditions indispensable for success in war.” Gray credited British sea power in World War I, Anglo-American sea power in World War II, and NATO’s sea power in the Cold War for the attainment of victory in those conflicts.

At the time of our victory in the Cold War, the U.S. Navy boasted more than 600 ships. Today, we have less than half that number. This would not be the first time in history where victory-inspired hubris produced the nemesis of neglect in our defenses. (RELATED: Generals Should Win Wars Before Declaring Victory)

Our ability to deter China from invading or blockading Taiwan, for example, has greatly diminished since 1950. China’s PLA Navy today deploys more warships than we do (370 to 291), and it is narrowing the gap in capabilities. It is projected that by 2030, those numbers will be even more favorable to China. (RELATED: China’s Threat to Taiwan: Intentions and Capabilities)

Since 2022, China has added 30 ships to its fleet, while we have added two. Even more concerning is the fact that China’s shipbuilding capacity is more than 200 times greater than ours, meaning that the PLA can replace ship losses in war much faster than we can. All of these developments undermine deterrence.

In his masterful book The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, historian Paul Kennedy showed how imperial overstretch and defense neglect over time ended Great Britain’s command of what Mackinder called the “world ocean.”

America’s involvement in endless peripheral wars since its Cold War victory, combined with its neglect of its shipbuilding capacity, has placed us in a position where the deterrent value of our navy vis-à-vis China is diminishing.

Luttwak is right: unless we repair our shipbuilding capacity, the American Navy will wither away, and we will lose our ability to dominate the world ocean. And if China commands the world ocean, the “liberal world order” will come to an end.

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