Peter Franklin: Why a Trump-Putin axis does not make a case for the European Union

Peter Franklin is an Associate Editor of UnHerd.

David Willetts has very politely taken me to task for an article in which I referred to the “Remoaner Left”. I do accept that many Remainers are neither moaners nor lefties. That said, the main force of the Remain movement, as embodied by the People’s Vote campaign, chose the path of conflict — attempting to overturn the biggest mandate in our history.

We all know how that worked out for them. They destroyed Theresa May’s Brexit, only to get the Boris Johnson version instead. You reap what you sow.

Meanwhile in America, the Democrats also failed to take the hint the voters gave them in 2016. They used the Biden Presidency to pursue a hyper-liberal immigration policy while launching one culture war after another against the “deplorables“. The result was the unlikely comeback of Donald J Trump. Again, sowing → reaping.

But isn’t there a delicious irony to be had here — delicious, at least, to Remainer tastebuds? With Trump back in the White House and busily deconstructing the western alliance, isn’t this a slam-dunk case for British reintegration into the European Union?

It’s certainly a case for the nations of Europe to take full responsibility for the defence of their own continent, but the very last thing we need is for the EU to lead the process (which is exactly what Ursula von der Leyen has in mind). In fact, it’s hard to think of an organisation less suited to the task.

Let’s begin with some basic geography.

A new defence architecture for Europe needs to involve nations that are not — and, most likely, won’t be — part of the EU.

Obviously, there’s the UK — which along with along with France is western Europe’s only semi-serious military power. Next, there’s Canada — not, of course, a European country, but important to the defence of the Arctic and the GIUK gap in the North Atlantic. Turkey also deserves a mention. You don’t have to be a fan of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to see that few world leaders have more successively frustrated Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions. Both in the Middle East and the Black Sea region, Turkey is a vital counterweight to Russia. And then there’s Ukraine itself. Assuming that it’s not left neutered and defenceless by a Trump-Putin stitch-up, no nation today has had more experience of resisting Russia’s military might. In short, the EU isn’t big enough.

There’s an opposite problem in the shape of the EU countries that aren’t NATO members and maintain an official stance of neutrality — Austria, Ireland and Malta. How can the EU lead on the defence on Europe when it has member states that are literally not on side?

David Willetts argues against the “assumption that the EU is a socialist project.” He may be surprised to know that that I’m in agreement with him there.

Indeed, the idea that the EU exemplifies progressive politics of any kind is laughable. Have we forgotten what the European Central Bank did to the Greeks? And just look at the rise of Right-wing populism across the continent: as a remarkable chart from The Economist shows, the various parties that comprise the European “hard Right” now have a higher share of the vote than any other political family — whether conservative, social democrat, socialist, liberal or green. There’s no sign of the populist wave abating.

It should be said that this category is a mixed bag and includes some ardent Atlanticists like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni. But there’s a vociferous anti-NATO element too — such as Germany’s AfD, which had just celebrated its best-ever election result. In some EU countries, Putin-friendly politicians are already in power. Just look at Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, which voted with Russia (and the US) against Ukraine at the United Nations.

As this tendency grows in strength and influence, how can EU institutions be trusted to lead the struggle against Russian subversion and outright aggression? Remember that key positions on bodies like the European Commission, the European Council and the Council of Ministers are divided up or rotated between all member states.

For the moment, the old EU establishment is still in control, but a consensus-shattering event, like the election of Marine Le Pen as President of France or the collapse of the German “firewall” against the AfD can no longer be ruled-out. Anyone looking to the EU as a bulwark against Trumpism, has badly under-estimated the danger of Euro-Trumpism.

Even if the EU-as-we-know-it survives, its record does not inspire confidence. Don’t forget that Putin’s forces started seizing Ukrainian territory in 2014.

That was followed by Donald Trump’s first term in which he made his long-term intentions abundantly clear. Unfortunately, the EU responded with a lamentable lack of urgency. Trump’s big demand — that European nations meaningfully increase their defence spending — was largely ignored. The 2022 invasion was a wake-up moment, but it took British action to shame the French and Germans into arming Ukraine.

As for the EU’s sanctions regime — that’s been leakier than a Russian pipeline. One only has to look at the spike of European exports to countries that just happen to border Russia to see what’s going on. As for all those expressions of solidarity that Volodymyr Zelensky’s received from various European leaders, they’re lovely; but confiscating Putin’s shadow fleet of oil tankers would be lovelier — and not before time.

Admittedly, the EU isn’t famous for moving very fast on anything — much to the frustration of the most ardent federalists. But that’s a serious impediment to an effective policy of rearmament.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in respect to nuclear deterrence. If America folds up its nuclear umbrella, who will replace it? Last month, a Belgian MEP called on France to transfer its deterrent to the European Union. Emmanuel Macron should “place the French force de frappe in European hands, [just] as Helmut Kohl put the Deutsche Mark in European hands.”

Even if the French were minded to make such gesture — which they absolutely wouldn’t be — how exactly would a “Common Nuclear Policy” work? Would the red button be controlled by Qualified Majority Voting? Or would it rotate from member state to member state on a six monthly basis? Perhaps Macron could just give the codes to Ursula von der Leyen and hope for the best.

Obviously, none of that’s going to happen — but the underlying question does need an answer: without the Americans or breaking the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, how does Europe get covered?

Friedrich Merz, the incoming Chancellor of Germany, has been giving it some thought.

His suggestion is that his country and others could share a nuclear deterrent with France and/or Britain. This would be much more compatible With British than French nuclear doctrine. Therefore, if the US does definitively turn its back on Europe, Brexit Britain is the likeliest plan B. An atomic backstop, if you will.

Would such a role be in our national interest?

Yes, but only if certain conditions were agreed to.

Firstly, that any such arrangement would only cover a coalition of the genuinely willing — no time-wasters or fair-weather friends.

Secondly, that costs would be shared as appropriate.

Thirdly, that the shared umbrella is not used as an alternative to conventional rearmament.

Fourthly, that the EU’s security and defence policy should go back to being a standalone organisation (as it was in the days of the Western European Union) with full membership not dependent on EU membership.

And, fifthly, that the commitment to higher defence spending should go hand-in-hand with cooperation on industrial strategy. As Nick Timothy argues, Europe cannot afford rearmament unless it supports — and is supported by — a policy of re-industrialisation.

How this coalition of the willing would relate to NATO depends on what’s left of it. But even if Trump takes the US out of the treaty altogether; Britain must endeavour to hold the door open to American re-involvement.

These are dark days and there’s probably worse to come. Yet we must not abandon all hope.

As Henry Olsen explains in the New York Post, “Trump voters broadly sympathize with Ukraine in its conflict with Russia“. At some point, the White House might also notice that 90% of US military and related aid to Ukraine benefits American industry. It’s also worth noting that not long before the bust-up with Zelensky, Trump mused about getting back the occupied portion of the Black Sea coast for Ukraine — that’s absolutely no guarantee, but nor does he seem committed to wholesale Russian conquest.

One last glimmer is that when JL Partners asked Americans who their country’s biggest ally is, 43% of Americans said Britain (only 6% said Russia).

The western alliance is not yet lost — and our own country might just be the glue that holds it together.