North Korea’s Kim likely looking for payback from Putin by ‘Victory Day,’ May 9

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea’s Kim Jong-un wants payback from Vladimir Putin for his troops’ sacrifices in Russia’s war against Ukraine — something Moscow is moving belatedly to address, a leading expert said Tuesday.

Russian air interventions off Korea during recent South Korea-U.S. military drills and visits to Pyongyang by two Kremlin power players are likely elements in a wider exchange package for North Korea’s munitions supply and troop deployment, Doo Jin-ho told foreign reporters in Seoul.

The South Korean defense expert, who heads the Global Strategy Division of the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, anticipates an upcoming trip by Mr. Kim to Moscow around May 9.

A formal, bilateral alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang is the most visible relationship to emerge within the so-called “CRINK.” CRINK is shorthand for the alignment of the authoritarian states of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — though the degree to which quadrilateral cooperation takes place is up for debate.

Pyongyang is estimated to have supplied Moscow with millions of munitions — artillery shells and tactical rockets — for use in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Iran, too, has supplied Russia with weapons, notably strike drones.

But in 2024, Mr. Kim and Russian President Vladimir. Putin signed a comprehensive strategic partnership, complete with a mutual defense clause. Subsequently, North Korea became the only country to dispatch troops to fight in Mr. Putin’s war, after Ukraine stormed into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in August.

A dispatch of 11,000-13,000 elite North Korean troops in October was buttressed by an additional dispatch of approximately 3,000 in January. The North Koreans are estimated to have suffered as many as 5,000 casualties.

The two nations share a land border and are opaque states, obfuscating intelligence collection. Considerable analyses cover how, and with what, Moscow intends to repay Pyongyang.

Support against U.S., South Korea

On March 14, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko arrived in Pyongyang for a meeting some analysts suspect may have become heated.

“I believe [Mr. Rudenko’s visit] did not have a positive atmosphere compared to past meetings,” said Mr. Doo. “I believe North Korea used the meeting to express dissatisfaction with Russia, and the Russian embassy recommended follow-up actions.”

Moscow may have been jolted into action.

On March 15, Russian military aircraft breached South Korea’s Air Identification Zone, an unprecedented eight times. The incursions compelled Seoul to scramble its own warplanes.

Distinct from globally recognized sovereign air space, an ADIZ lacks basis in international law. ADIZs are nevertheless declared by multiple capitals as national air-security perimeters.

The aerial action-reaction sequence took place during South Korea-US “Freedom Shield” spring military drills, which ran March 10-20.

On March 21, Secretary of the Russian State Security Council Sergei Shoigu landed in Pyongyang.

Though Western media interpreted Mr. Shoigu’s removal from his position of Minister of Defense in May 2024 as a demotion due to Russian military blunders in Ukraine, a London-based Russia expert told The Washington Times that is misreporting.

As a longtime confidante of Mr. Putin, Mr. Shoigu has a critical role, she said: Ensuring the sustainability of Moscow’s military-industrial complex amid hostilities and sanctions.

“Shoigu was sent as special envoy right after Freedom Shield to reaffirm a commitment to North Korea in the event of a possible conflict,” Mr. Doo said. “Of course, the visit was carefully timed to avoid provoking the U.S. and to maintain South Korean relations.”

He suggested Mr. Shoigu had three tasks in Pyongyang: To express gratitude to North Korea; to reaffirm the import of the 2024 agreement; and to invite Mr. Kim to Moscow.

Mr. Doo believed that Mr. Kim had three grievances: Delays in Russian compensation for his troop dispatch; Moscow’s passive stance on a pair of North Korean troops captured by Ukraine; and a lack of strategic communications on Moscow’s ongoing negotiations with the Trump administration.

Two North Korean soldiers have been captured by Ukraine. They have not been factored into the POW exchanges that are routinely negotiated between Kiev and Moscow, and may defect to South Korea.

Victory Day visit?

Mr. Doo expected Mr. Kim to continue troop deployments to earn “a political stake” at conflict’s end.

Key North Korean military figures, such as the deputy chief of the General Staff, the director of Army Operations and the commander of the Reconnaissance General Bureau — North Korea’s intelligence and sabotage arm — remain in Russia.

North Koreans have suffered heavy casualties as, due to language and doctrinal barriers, they cannot operate effectively with Russian armor, artillery, air power or drones. They have taken on a high-risk battlefield role as unsupported infantry shock troops.

However, they have demonstrated impressive physical fitness and marksmanship, while maintaining unit cohesion and determination.

“I think Kim is using troop levels as a bargaining chip,” Mr. Doo said. “I believe he is monitoring the Russian response … whether it offers meaningful compensation for his deployment and losses.”

Mr. Doo believes preliminary talks are underway ahead of May 9.

That date, Russia’s “Victory Day,” marks the end of World War II in Europe and holds special significance this year: 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of war’s end.

Even so, Mr. Doo does not anticipate Mr. Kim joining Mr. Putin on the Kremlin saluting podium, given that other national leaders, such as Chinese President Xi Jinping, are expected.

“Kim Jong-un has not attended any multilateral summits,” Mr. Doo said. “He is not well prepared.”

Though North Korean troops may goose-step with Russian troops on Red Square on May 9, he expected Mr. Putin and Mr. Kim to cement ties and sign deals, either before or after Victory Day.

In addition to supplies of oil and grain — keystrengths of the Russian economy, major weakness in North Korea’s — he anticipated Moscow potentially upgrading North Korea’s satellite and air defense technologies.

Warplanes and surface warships are two assets Russia might donate, Mr. Doo said: Mr. Kim’s air force and navy are low tech.

However, he did not expect Russia to upgrade North Korea’s strategic assets — its weapons of mass destruction, such as the country’s nascent nuclear submarine program.

That would infuriate the U.S. — a target for those classes of armaments — and could grant North Korean strategic independence, reducing Russian influence.

Still, regardless of what Russia offers, North Korea’s army — which had, before last year, not fought a major conflict since 1953 — is likely already reaping the benefits of millennial combat exposure

“On April 4, Kim gave on-site guidance to his special forces, and said they have to enhance tactics and capabilities in line with evolving trends,” Mr. Doo said. “North Korean soldiers are learning the modern warfare landscape.”