It is in neither the Conservatives’ or Reform’s short-term interests to ‘unite the right’

In the Sunday Times, Tim Shipman reported that a group of ‘former officials’ (of Vote Leave, presumably) are plotting to oust Kemi Badenoch as Conservative leader and staunch local election losses via a pact with Reform UK:

“This weekend it can be revealed that a significant number of senior Conservatives are concluding that if Sir Keir Starmer, the current favourite to win the next election, is to be stopped, Farage is the horse they will have to put their money on. MPs, donors and former party aides have been meeting in secret to draw up a campaign to “Unite the Right”, with even moderate Tories now prepared to see Farage as prime minister to stop Labour.”

As an aside, it would be interesting to know which “moderate Tories” are suddenly up for the idea of Nigel Farage as prime minister; presumably none of those whose priority was as recently as November backing whoever was best able to block Robert Jenrick. Anyway, Shippers continues:

“The Unite the Right campaign will be “explicitly agnostic” about whether this means co-operation on shared policy areas such as immigration, a non-aggression pact so each party focuses on the seats it can win, a formal electoral pact or a full-blown merger or takeover of one party by the other, in order to maximise support.

“One model being openly discussed is the relationship between the German centre-right parties. “Tories and Reform should become the CDU-CSU,” a former Conservative adviser said.”

So. Such discussions are not bad, insofar as they focus on the medium-to-long term. If Farage can hold his party together and maintain at least a substantial share of its position in the polls, Reform will secure a serious parliamentary breakthrough at the next election. If that happens, it probably becomes the default right-wing option in large parts of the country.

At that point, the question probably is what form of arrangement is worked out with the Conservatives, and how long that takes to do. I’ve taken as three baseline scenarios New Zealand (independent but usually cooperate, à la the Nationals and New Zealand First), Australia (separate parties in permanent coalition, à la the Liberals, Nationals, et al.) and Canada (full merger, à la the Progressive Conservatives and Canadian Alliance).

The CDU/CSU model is a bit more left-field, as Reform’s emerging heartlands are rather more disparate and dispersed than ‘Bavaria’, but maybe that works too.

But all of that is for working out after the next election, not before. Reaching a formal agreement ahead of a 2029 general election makes very little sense for either party.

For Reform, the obvious question is what they gain by formally linking up with a party which only just left office courtesy of the most shattering rout in its long history. This is especially the case because nearly all the seats in which it placed second last July are held by Labour; an alliance with the Tories might put them over the top, but it would also make it much harder for Farage to woo angry voters who are bitterly disappointed with this government but still remember how bitterly disappointed they were with the last one.

The Conservatives, meanwhile, would be playing with two fires. First, a deal now would lock in Reform as a major player at the next election, when it is by no means impossible (which is not to say likely) that the wheels will come off the teal warmachine before that date. Even in its current, sad state, the Tory Party has a lot of institutional advantages over its challenger, not least that it remains bigger (in the Commons and likely in actively-campaigning members, for now) and richer.

At the same time, formally linking up with Farage means at least tacitly endorsing all the people Reform ends up selecting as candidates, which would be a courageous decision, especially if its treatment of Rupert Lowe has scared off people of real ability and experience.

It would also make it harder for the Conservatives to woo Labour voters in the bits of the country where the two are going head-to-head, and increase the risk of incumbent Tory MPs getting picked off by well-organised Liberal Democrat and Green campaigns – a danger not to be under-estimated, given that this is the most marginal Commons since 1945 in terms of seat majorities.

Four years is a long time, of course. Significant changes in circumstances could shift the balance of the argument in favour of a pact before 2029, or at least to a late or even unofficial divvying up of seats and campaigning resources come the campaign itself.

But however unshakeable the instinct amongst parts of the Conservative Party that the answer is always a deal with Farage, both parties should remember that the big winners at the last election were Labour (+211 seats) and Lib Dems (+64 seats), and it is only by peeling voters away from those parties that the right can hope for another Commons majority.

It is very likely the case that the Tories and Reform appeal to different parts of Labour’s 2024 vote, and do most damage at election time by maximising their distinctive appeals. But that very much militates against a formal pact – for now, at least.

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