American Nuclear Weapons in Poland? No. – The American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator

At first blush it almost seems rational: placing U.S. nuclear weapons in Poland, a NATO member that spends nearly five percent of its GDP on defense would enhance deterrence against a potential Russian attack. And Polish President Andrzej Duda requested it. The move would reassure Poland that the United States “will fully honor its security commitment” under NATO’s Article V and will “ensure NATO’s deterrence is real, credible, and available when it matters,” so writes Peter Doran of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Polish pilots and aircraft, Doran continues, should be certified to “carry out deterrence missions” with America’s B-61 tactical nukes. What could possibly go wrong?

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are already deployed in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey. But why limit this move to Poland? If stationing nuclear weapons in NATO countries enhances deterrence, why not put them in Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic? What about Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Why not enhance deterrence in Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Slovakia and Slovenia? And what about the newest members of NATO — Finland and Sweden?

But Doran doesn’t advocate that. Nuclear sharing, he writes, is “[r]eserved for America’s closest and most capable partners.” Apparently, some NATO countries deserve better deterrence than others despite what Article V says (an attack upon one is an attack upon all). Wouldn’t Russia understand that, too? Wouldn’t this selective nuclear sharing signal to Vladimir Putin that we value Poland more than the Baltic states and those other NATO members that would remain unprotected by American tactical nukes? (RELATED: How Does an Entire Continent Fail?)

But should Doran’s enhanced deterrence scheme be limited to Europe? After all, China is a greater threat to our national security than Russia, so perhaps if Taiwan’s democratically elected president requests the U.S. to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the island, we should do so. And, like Poland, Taiwan’s pilots and aircraft could be certified to carry out deterrence missions. Isn’t that the logic of Doran’s proposal? (RELATED: China’s Threat to Taiwan: Intentions and Capabilities)

There is a fine line between deterrence and provocation — and both are in the eyes of the beholder. What we and our allies view as deterrence, Russia and China will likely view as a provocation — and it doesn’t matter which side is objectively correct. (RELATED: Running Out of Cards in Kursk)

A dramatic move like that suggested by Doran may produce unintended consequences, and in the nuclear realm, such consequences can be catastrophic. U.S. national security policy has since the end of the Cold War attempted to strengthen deterrence by non-nuclear means.

In the 1950s when the United States had nuclear superiority, we relied on “massive retaliation” to deter potential great power adversaries. As our opponents’ nuclear arsenals grew, massive retaliation became less credible and led to a posture of “flexible response” to enhance deterrence by nuclear and conventional means.

Then Ronald Reagan used peace through strength and diplomacy to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe (the so-called zero option and INF Treaty). Doran’s proposal would begin to undo Reagan’s work and nuclear weapons would once again populate the “bloodlands.”

That is why President Trump wants our NATO allies and Taiwan and our other Pacific allies to provide more for their own defense — especially non-nuclear defense capabilities. The more our allies build up their conventional defenses, the less chance they will have to find out whether an American president — any American president — will trade Washington for Warsaw or New York for Taipei.

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