Garvan Walshe: Don’t trade turning a blind eye to Erdogan’s domestic repression for cooperation against Russia

Garvan Walshe is a former National and International Security Policy Adviser to the Conservative Party. He runs the political tech company Article7 – Intelligence for democrats

Turkey has to cooperate against Russia in its own interests.

With Trump in the White House and Europe looking for all the military support he can get, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seizing the moment. Since the opposition decisively won local elections in 2024, it has been obvious he and his ruling AK Party were heading for defeat at the next presidential polls. Though there are still three years until elections have to be held,  twenty years in power, discontent at his authoritarian and anti-secular politics an absolutely terrible economy have taken their toll.  Winning the next election called for something radical: jailing the leader of the opposition.

The main opposition CHP, originally Ataturk’s party, had put aside the squabbling and deference to age that caused them to lose the 2023 presidential vote, to pick one leader, Ekrem Imamoglu. So unified they had become that the party’s primaries had only one candidate registered, Imamoglu himself. 

No Soviet style charade — this reflected the consensus that Erdogan would only be beaten if they were united.

Imamoglu’s arrest, on dubious corruption and frankly absurd terrorism charges, followed the an order to rescind the degree he received from Istanbul University. (In Turkey, presidents are required to have a university degree).  The disqualification is an element of a three part plan.

Immediately before Erdogan had consolidated his power by reaching a peace deal with the Kurdish separatist terrorists of the PKK. This he hopes, will help him win back part of the Kurdish vote, which the regime had been losing to left-leaning Kurdish parties, most recently known as DEM. Previous incarnations of the party had been banned, and their previous leader, Selhattin Demritas, has been inprisoned since 2016.

Increasing support among the Kurds has, Erdogan hopes, a second effect. The CHP has a backup candidate in the form of Ankara Mayor Mansour Yavas. Yavas however is less friendly to the Kurds. That difference in support could be decisive, and allow Erdogan to retain power with his ultra-nationalist (and strongly anti-Kurdish allies of the MHP).

The final element is time: opposition movements need to sustain momentum, ideally by provoking confrontations in which the regime miscalculates, but it will be hard to do so for three years. Erdogan also hopes he can outlast the discontent.

Yet this plan is not without its flaws.

Wags immediately pointed out that a previous mayor of Istanbul had been arrested only to go on to win the presidency. His name was Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Imamoglu is already turning into somewhat of a martyr. 13 million non-members of the CHP also voted in the primaries (they were allowed to cast a “solidarity vote”). The party will establish contact with these 13 million people, and seek to mobilise them in the confrontations ahead. Police have tried to crack down on demonstrations, but been unable to enforce the bans. They’ve resorted to arresting photographers and journalists as well as opposition leaders.

The split with the Kurds has not materialised. The DEM party has thrown its weight behind the CHP campaign for their leader’s release.  Finally, time is not necessarily on Erdogan’s side. If it can lead the opposition to tire, it also allows the economy to continue to worsen. Imamoglu’s arrest alarmed investors and sent the Turkish Lira tumbling even further. Interest rates were raised to 44%.

Erodgan feels relatively immune because of the international situation. This US Administration will do little more than express mild concern. European countries, including the UK, have begun to involve Turkey in discussions about the defence against Russian aggression.  He is right that this will mute the European reaction: there are no calls for economic sanctions against the Turkish economy, for example, in response to this expansion of repression.

But he would be making a mistake if he thinks he can present assistance against Russia as a favour to Europe’s democracies. This underplays Turkish fear of Russian expansionism and exaggerates the relevance of any possible Turkish contribution.

Turkey’s biggest interest is in preventing Russia from taking control of the northern coast of the black sea, which requires a strong Ukraine. In this connection, the apparent deal related to a maritime ceasefire just forced on Ukraine is a setback for Turkish interests too.

Ukraine had beaten the Black Sea Fleet back from Crimea to port at Novorossysk.

The second aspect has to do with the forces Turkey has available. A Turkish contribution to securing Europe would be welcome, particularly because Ankara has strong land forces at its disposal, but would not be decisive or be able to mitigate the most important gaps left by a possible US withdrawal, which are chiefly related to command and control, the suppression of enemy air defence and tactical nuclear weapons.

There are therefore good reasons for the UK, France and Europe’s other leading powers to resist any attempts by Turkey to condition cooperation on letting Erdogan get away with cementing his hold on power. Such cooperation is in Turkey’s own interests already and it would be self-defeating for Erdogan to withdraw it so he can continue hanging onto power in a country that increasingly thinks he had overstayed its welcome.

Rather, Europeans should start making contingency plans for a transition from power, that might even involve early elections, or a return to a more parliamentary political system, in order to forestall deepening civil conflict in Turkey.

The most important interest the UK and EU now share with Turkey is in cooperating to limit Russian expansionism. This is best served by stable cooperation between the diplomatic, military and intelligence institutions of the countries involved, rather than being a question of the occupant of the Turkish presidential office.

Even if this appears to have been a good time for Erdogan to gamble with increased repression, it is still a gamble whose success is far from certain.  A continued campaign to neutralise the opposition risks provoking domestic conflict. We need instead to help find a way for him to back down.